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Case isolation and contact tracing is a widely-used intervention method for controlling epidemic
outbreaks. Here, we argue that the effectiveness of contact tracing and isolation is likely underesti-
mated by existing studies because they do not take into account the different forms of heterogeneity
and sampling biases from the network structure. Specifically, we show that contact tracing can be
even more effective than acquaintance sampling at locating hubs. Our results call for the need for
contact tracing to go both backward and forward, in multiple steps, to leverage all forms of positive
biases. Using simulations on networks with a power-law degree distribution, we show that this deep
contact tracing can potentially prevent almost all further transmissions even at a small probability of
detecting infected individuals. We also show that, when the number of traced contacts is small, the
number of prevented transmission per traced node is even higher—although most traced individuals
are healthy—than that from case isolation without contact tracing. Our results also have important
consequences for new implementations of digital contact tracing and we argue backward and deep
tracing can be incorporated without the important sacrificing privacy-preserving requirements of
these new platforms.
INTRODUCTION
Contact tracing, combined with case isolation, is one
of the most intuitive and oldest methods for control-
ling epidemic outbreaks [1–3]. Contact tracing is consid-
ered a highly effective strategy if the contact network is
concretely defined (e.g. sexually-transmitted diseases) or
when the outbreak is still at the early stage. For instance,
it was possible to control the severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003 with case isolation
and contact tracing [4]. However, contact tracing, which
involves interviewing and tracing contacts, is a labor-
intensive and costly process. When there are many cases
or the route of spreading is not clearly defined (e.g. air-
borne diseases), the traditional contact tracing can thus
become cost inhibitive. Therefore, a critical question in
contact tracing has been assessing its viability [5] or the
cost-benefit tradeoffs [6].
Meanwhile, recent studies on digital contact tracing
have demonstrated that leveraging smart mobile devices
may allow much more swift and efficient contact trac-
ing [7], asking an important question of whether digital
contact tracing can overcome the existing limitations of
contact tracing. Yet, existing studies do not fully lever-
age insights from network science about the underlying
contact structure, particularly regrading the imapct of
its heterogeneity.
Heterogeneous networks, where the number of contacts
varies significantly among individuals, have been of great
interest in network epidemiology because such hetero-
geneity can alter the fundamental nature of the dynamics
in the form of, for instance, vanishing epidemic thresh-
old [8], hierarchical spreading [9], and large variance in
individual’s reproductive number [10] as well as the fi-
nal outbreak size [11]. Under the assumption of hetero-
geneous contact network structure, epidemic dynamics
is dominated by the hubs and the superpreading events
caused by them.
Superspreading events can be easily found during an
epidemic outbreak. For instance, a famous example from
the COVID-19 pandemic would be the “Patient 31” in
South Korea [12]. The patient was the first positive case
from a church that was later identified, via contact trac-
ing, as the single biggest super-spreading event in South
Korea, linked to more than 5, 000 cases, which account
for more than half of South Korea’s total cases at the
time [12]. Super-spreading events are common in the
past epidemic outbreaks [10], and they are often discov-
ered through contact tracing efforts [13, 14]. Contact
tracing’s ability to identify super-spreading events raise
important questions: how effective is the contact tracing
at identifying superspreading events? How does the het-
erogeneity in the contact network affect the effectiveness
of contact tracing?
Here, we show that the effectiveness of contact trac-
ing strongly depends on the degree heterogeneity of the
networks and can become extremely efficient in hetero-
geneous networks. Importantly for new applications of
digital contact tracing, we show that this heterogeneity
is not fully leveraged by the most common contact trac-
ing implementations that are limited to future contacts
or to a single step in the contact network.
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Let us first sketch the central idea. Given that the
dynamics of epidemic spreading is dominated by hubs in
static heterogeneous networks [8, 9, 15], let us first fo-
cus on the degree distribution of the traced nodes. Con-
sider a random network with degree distribution pk. The
probability generating function for this network’s degree
distribution can be written as
G0(x) =
∑
k
pkx
k. (1)
First, note that the spreading process, at the early stage,
can be considered as sampling nodes by following edges
(see Fig. 1a). Because nodes are sampled proportionally
to their degree, the degree distribution of the sampled
(infected) nodes would follow, not pk, but qk =
kpk∑
k kpk
.
Second, assume that the disease spread through an edge
with a probability T , which we call transmissibility of the
disease, and this assumption allows us to approximate the
disease spreading by a bond percolation process [15–17].
If we focus on a transmission tree—a connected compo-
nent from the bond percolation process with probability
T (see Fig. 1b)—we can consider it as another network
where the original degree of the nodes is distributed ac-
cording to qk because the nodes in this tree are sampled
by following edges. Now, an idealized and simplified con-
tact tracing can be thought as a process of (i) identifying
an infected node from the transmission tree and (ii) fol-
lowing the edges of the node to further identify other
infected nodes in the transmission tree. Because the de-
gree of a node in the transmission tree is proportional
to its original degree and because following an edge in
the transmission tree is once again biased by the degree
of a node, the degree distribution of the contact-traced
infected nodes would be ∼ k2pk rather than ∼ kpk. In
other words, contact tracing can be highly efficient—even
more efficient than acquaintance sampling [18, 19]—at
identifying high-degree nodes, or super-spreading events.
Simply put, this is because we can leverage the work re-
quired in identifying an infected node in the first place,
and then do biased sampling over the already biased sub-
set of infected nodes.
We can also explicitly take the directionality into ac-
count by considering a directional transmission tree (see
Fig. 1c). For the sake of simplicity, let us consider a
case shown in Fig. 1c and assume that tracing only oc-
curs from offsprings to parents because the nodes at l−1
are more likely to be asymptomatic or already recovered
when the disease spread further down. Because the nodes
in the tree are already sampled by following an edge, the
node with original degree k is k times more likely to be
in the transmission tree in the first place. Then the gen-
erating function for the excess degree distribution can be
Focal node
(Offspring)
Parent
pk
FIG. 1. (a) A transmission occurs from a ‘parent’ to a ‘focal
node’ (or an offspring). (b) Because a node is infected through
an edge, at the early stage of the epidemic, the degree distri-
bution of the infected nodes is roughly proportional to kpk.
Because the degree of a node in the transmission tree is also
proportional to the original degree, sampling from the trans-
mission tree via an edge will be even more biased; it samples
nodes proportional to k2pk. (c) If contact tracing perfectly
identifies the parents, we sample nodes based on k2pk. (d)
The true list of recent contacts (C) always includes the par-
ent, along with other neighbors. The actual list of contacts
that get traced (C′) is a subset of C.
written as
G1(x) =
G′0(x)
G′0(1)
=
1∑
k kpk
∑
k
kpkx
k−1. (2)
An extreme case of perfect tracing would be the case
where we can immediately identify the true parent node
once we identify an infected node. If we compare nodes
at level l+1, as illustrated in Fig. 1c, node b is three times
more likely to be traced than a; that is, for a node with
original degree k, the probability of being traced from an
offspring is proportional to k − 1. Combining these two
factors, the probability that a node with degree k gets
contact-traced is proportional to k(k − 1) or roughly to
k2. The remaining degree that can be potentially blocked
by the contact tracing (e.g. two remaining white nodes in
the case of b in Fig. 1c) can be captured by the following
probability generating function:
G2(x) =
G′1(x)
G′1(1)
=
1∑
k k(k − 1)pk
∑
k
k(k − 1)pkxk−2.
(3)
This intuition can be easily checked by running a SIR
model on a network and sampling the parents of a ran-
domly chosen infected node (see Fig. 2a). As expected,
if we sample infected nodes and trace their parents, their
degree distribution closely matches the distribution de-
scribed by G2(x).
3Needless to say, it is impossible to perfectly identify
the disease pathway in practice; we can only obtain an
incomplete list of recent contacts of a node. Note that,
however, the parent node who is responsible for the infec-
tion of the focal node is, by definition, always belongs to
the true list of recent contacts (denoted as C in Fig. 1d).
Therefore, when we obtain C ′, the set of nodes to be
traced (e.g. via an interview or through digital contact
tracing), the parent node is more likely to be included,
and thus more likely to be traced. Moreover, if the par-
ent node is a super-spreader, then it would appear in
many recent contact lists (from different nodes) and be-
comes much more likely to be contact-traced. Imagine
an infected node i that has spread the disease to n of
its neighbors. If there is a constant probability (p) for
i to be traced (included in C ′) then the probability of
i being contact-traced is 1 − (1 − p)n. In other words,
super-spreaders are more likely to show up, potentially
multiple times, in the list of recent contacts to be traced
even in practical scenarios. Based on this idea, we hy-
pothesize that contact tracing is highly effective in het-
erogeneous networks, especially if it is allowed to move
at least two steps deep—immediately identifying and iso-
lating the offsprings of the identified parents—and both
backward and forward, in the contact network.
101 102 103
k
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
C
C
D
F
a
G0(x) (∼ pk)
G1(x) (∼ kpk)
G2(x) (∼ k(k − 1)pk)
Infected (t = 1.0)
Sampled parents (t = 1.0)
101 102 103
k
b
Infected
Traced, all
Traced, top 25
Traced, top 10
FIG. 2. (a) The degree distribution of the infected nodes
and that of the parents of randomly sampled (1%) infected
nodes at t = 1.0. They closely follow the distribution G1
and G2 respectively. (b) The effectiveness of more realistic
contact tracing in terms of hub-sampling. Even under more
realistic scenarios where we cannot accurately identify the
true parents, contact tracing reaches hubs effectively. Such
tendency increases as we sort the list of nodes to be traced
based on how many times they appear in the list and pick the
most frequent ones. Parameters used in this simulation are:
ps = 0.01, pt = 0.5, and pr = 0.5. We run the simulation 50
times and sample the nodes of each type for each simulation.
Then, we compute the degree distributions for the nodes.
We test this hypothesis with simulations. First, we
examine the degree distribution of the contact-traced
nodes. We create a network with Baraba´si-Albert
model [20], with N = 106 and m = 5. We then run
the SIR model with transmission rate τ = 0.1, recovery
rate γ = 1, and initial seed fraction ρ = 0.0001, by using
the EoN package [21]. At the early stage (t = 1.0), we ex-
amine the degree distribution of all infected nodes (blue)
and that of the parents of sampled infected nodes (red).
As shown in Fig. 2a, the empirical distributions closely
follow the expected probability distribution.
We then simulate the contact tracing. Let us assume
that there exists a true list of recent contacts, which
always contains the parent. The actual contacts to be
traced is obtained by sampling from this true recent con-
tact list. This process can be described as following: (i)
at time t, a fraction (ps) of infected nodes will be identi-
fied and isolated (no further infection); (ii) for each iden-
tified node, we add the parent to the true recent-contact
list and add others with probability pt; (iii) we then sam-
ple nodes from this list with probability pr to create the
actual list of nodes to be traced. As we merge the lists
from many identified nodes, we keep the counts of each
node’s occurrences; if there was a super-spreading event,
the super-spreader is likely to appear multiple times in
the list. This procedure cannot be as effective as the
idealized perfect contact tracing. Yet, this scenario still
samples hubs much better than acquaintance sampling
(see Fig. 2b). As we focus more on those who ranked
high in the contact list, the effectiveness increases.
Let us now measure the effectiveness of contact tracing
more directly. We focus on a single intervention at time
t. At t, we perform a single course of the contact trac-
ing procedure as described above (with varying ps) and
measure how many further infections can be prevented
by contact tracing and isolation. We run the SIR model
simulation on the network and examine the transmission
events between t and t+ ∆. Formally, we measure
φ(t, t+ ∆) =
Tˆ (t, t+ ∆)
T (t, t+ ∆)
, (4)
where T (t, t + ∆) is the total number of transmission
events that would have happened between t and t + ∆
if there were no intervention at t, and Tˆ (t, t + ∆) is the
number of transmission events that would not happen be-
cause they were from the contact-traced nodes. As can
be seen in Fig. 3, even a tiny amount of contact trac-
ing is highly effective at preventing further spreading.
Even if we only detect 1% of currently infected nodes
and trace their contacts, it is enough to prevent about
half of the total near-future transmissions. The φ sat-
urates close to 1 when only 5% of contact tracing (see
Fig. 3 inset). In other words, almost all further transmis-
sions can be prevented by 5–10% contact tracing. This is
primarily because contact tracing can efficiently identify
super-spreaders; if we randomly sample infected nodes,
they are much more likely infected from a super-spreader
and thus likely lead us to the super-spreader.
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FIG. 3. A small fraction of contact tracing ps  1 efficiently
prevents a majority of transmission events. (a) Fraction of
isolated individuals by case isolation and contact tracing. (b)
The fraction of transmissions that are prevented (φ) between
t and t + ∆ (t = 3 and ∆ = 0.5). (c) Number of prevented
cases per traced or isolated individual. We run the SIR sim-
ulations for 30 networks generated by Baraba´si-Albert model
with same parameter used in Fig. 2 and ps ∈ [0, 1]. Each
point indicates the value averaged over the SIR model simu-
lations for the 30 generated networks. The translucent band
indicates the 95% confidence interval estimated by a boot-
strapping with 104 resamples.
We also examine the efficiency of contact tracing by
measuring the number of prevented future cases per
traced & isolated individuals (see Fig. 3c). The case iso-
lation baseline refers to the intervention where we isolate
only the infected individuals who have been discovered
(with probability ps from all infected individuals). Un-
like the isolation-alone strategy where every isolation is
almost guaranteed to prevent further spreading, the con-
tact tracing inevitably has to examine many healthy indi-
viduals. Therefore, contact tracing is almost always con-
sidered as a costly strategy unless the outbreak is at its
very early stage. However, our results demonstrate that
contact tracing can be even more efficient than case isola-
tion even if the epidemic is well on the way. Because con-
tact tracing is highly efficient at locating super-spreading
events and super-spreaders, it can prevent a huge num-
ber of further transmissions even with a small amount of
resource.
Our results indicate that contact tracing may be highly
effective and efficient strategy particularly if it were to be
performed at all. Contrary to the usual findings that sug-
gest a substantial amount of contact tracing is necessary
to control the epidemic [5], our results suggest that—if
strong heterogeneity in contact structure is present—any
amount of contact tracing is effective. Our results also
indicate that the ‘cheaper’ contact tracing offered by dig-
ital contact tracing may hold even greater potential than
previous suggested.
Gatherings
Individuals
FIG. 4. The biased sampling is also in play in a bipartite
network of people and gatherings. A high-degree gathering
is more likely be “infected” and it is also more likely to be
traced. Both sampling biases are roughly proportional to the
gathering’s degree in the bipartite network.
The same reasoning can be extended to the bi-
partite network of people and gatherings (see Fig. 4;
e.g. churches, grocery markets, or any spontaneous gath-
erings) [22]. The recently-proposed privacy-preserving
contact tracing protocols such as DP-3T [23] also works
in terms of ‘gatherings’ by marking each temporal seg-
ment with a unique code (gathering) and propagating
the identification of infected individuals through the past
gatherings. Existing studies also support the formalism
of people-gathering bipartite network. It has been shown
that the human mobility follow regular routines, making
it highly predictable [24, 25]. An important implication
of these studies is that the biparite network between peo-
ple and gatherings—such as public transportation sys-
tem, groceries, religious services, or even ad-hoc corri-
dor encounters—would be less dynamic than the network
of human contacts and proximate encounters, making a
static network model more plausible. Moreover, stud-
ies have shown that high temporal resolution proximity
detection can clearly reveal the people-gathering struc-
ture [22].
5In this bipartite network, the degree of an individual
roughly captures how mobile the person is across diverse
sets of places and gatherings, and the degree of a gather-
ing captures how large the gathering is. Let us use G0(x)
again to denote the generating function of the individu-
als’ degree distribution, and F0(x) to denote the generat-
ing function of the gatherings’ degree distribution, where
G0(x) =
∑
k
pkx
k, (5)
F0(x) =
∑
k
qkx
k. (6)
The transmission event happens from a person to others
via a gathering. When we sample a gathering from an
individual, the excess size of the gathering is generated
by
F1(x) =
F ′0(x)
F ′0(1)
=
1∑
k kqk
∑
k
kqkx
k−1, (7)
because we are sampling an edge. Therefore, the prob-
ability distribution of the number of one’s neighbors
through gatherings is captured by G0(F1(x)).
Let us assume that a gathering can be ‘infected’ by
an infected individual (see Fig. 4). If we were to sample
from all infected gatherings, the probability distribution
of the size of the gathering would be generated by F1(x).
Yet again, because larger gatherings would produce more
infections and thus more likely to be traced, the probabil-
ity generating function for the remaining contacts for a
gathering (except the original spreader and the identified
individual from which the contact tracing is initiated)
would be written as
F2(x) =
F ′1(x)
F ′1(1)
=
1∑
k(k
2 − k)qk
∑
k
k(k−1)qkxk−2, (8)
in the case of perfect contact tracing. Applying the same
logic above, we again expect that, even in more realis-
tic scenarios, a small amount of contact tracing would
be able to identify super-spreading events and prevent
numerous further disease transmission events.
We test this hypothesis by running simulations of SIR
model on bipartite networks. As is the case for the uni-
partite networks, tracing a small number of gatherings
prevents near-future transmissions more effectively than
case isolation and the efficiency of contact tracing is more
pronounced at the beginning with small ps. If we detect
10% of infected people and trace their gatherings, we
can prevent approximately a half of near-future transmis-
sions. The effectiveness for the contact tracing is more
pronounced for fewer gatherings (i.e., each gathering has
more people on average). In fact, if the 10% of nodes
are gatherings in the bipartite network, we can prevent
approximately twice more transmissions than that when
25% nodes are gatherings for ps = 0.01 (Fig. 5c and f).
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FIG. 5. Effectiveness of contact tracing for people-gathering
networks. We generate the networks using the configuration
model with a power-law degree distribution with exponent 3.
The fraction of gathering nodes are 25% for the left column
(a-c) and 10% for the right column (d-f). (a,d) Fraction of
isolated cases. (b,e) The fraction of transmissions that are
prevented between t and t + ∆ (t = 3 and ∆ = 0.5). (c,f)
Number of prevented cases per isolated case.
Our results imply that the proximity-based digital con-
tact tracing (e.g. DP-3T) can be exceptionally effective at
identifying super-spreading events and subsequently pre-
venting further transmissions from those who attended
those super-spreading events, much more so than cur-
rently assumed.
DISCUSSION
As we consider new privacy-preserving technologies
that can help contact tracing efforts, it is also impor-
tant to leverage known heterogeneity and sampling bi-
ases stemming from the underlying network structure of
contacts. Our results show the need for (i) backward
contact-tracing to identify the parent node of a detected
case over the transmission tree and (ii) deep contact trac-
ing to notify other recent contacts of this identified parent
node. While this will result in a lot more notifications, it
is a feature and not a problem per se: The goal is to iden-
tify potential super-spreading events that, by definition,
imply many contacts. Moreover, given that multiple sig-
nals is particularly indicative of high-risk as shown here,
such features can be potentially leveraged for better in-
tervention strategies.
Current implementations of digital contact tracing, in-
6cluding the Apple and Google partnership [26] and the
DP-3T proposal [23], are focused on a one-step process:
Notifying previous contacts of an infected individual to
take appropriate safety measures and get tested. They do
not explicitly consider the fact that one of these previous
contact is likely the parent node of the infected individual
that might be infecting other. Considering the require-
ments for testing in many regions, it is unlikely for the
parent node to be tested in time for the app to then notify
its heavily-biased number of excess neighbours. There-
fore, we urge the consideration of multi-step notification
feature that can fully leverage the biases from the contact
network structure.
Importantly, an implementation of our model does not
necessarily necessitate any compromise in terms of pri-
vacy or decentralization of the contact tracing protocol
itself [27]. One could also imagine a hybrid where pre-
vious notifications pushed to different devices are stored
in a decentralized database and deep contact tracing is
only undertaken once a given device has been notified
more than a certain amount of time, thereby increasing
its chance of being a parent node. The benefits of such
network-based contact-tracing could be great, especially
if accompanied by serious educational efforts for users to
comprehend the science behind the intervention and the
importance of their own role in our social network.
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